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Abstract 
Crime rates vary considerably by region and these differences are found to be persistent over 
time. The persistence of differences in regional crime rates over time may be explained by two 
factors. First, differences in the regional institutional and socio-economic conditions that 
determine crime equilibrium levels are persistent over time. Second, the effects of shocks 
affecting the crime rate are persistent over time. The aim of this paper is to disentangle these 
two sources of regional crime persistence in Argentinean regions over 1980-2008 and 
subperiods for different typologies of crime. Controlling for socio-economic and deterrence 
effect variables, we specify an econometric model to test the persistence of shocks to crime. 
Results support high persistence of the effects of shocks to crime.   
  
 
Resumen 
 
Las tasas de crimen varían considerablemente por región y estas diferencias son persistentes 
en el tiempo. La persistencia en las diferencias de la tasa de crimen regional puede ser 
explicada por dos factores. Primero, persistencia de las diferencias en las condiciones socio-
económicas e institucionales que determinan las tasas de crimen de equilibrio. Segundo, los 
shocks que afectan la tasa de crimen. El objetivo de este trabajo es distinguir estas dos 
fuentes de persistencia temporal en las provincias de Argentina en el período  1980-2008 y 
en subperíodos para diferentes tipos de crimen. Controlando por las variables socio-
económicas y de disuasión, especificamos un modelo econométrico para testear la 
pesistencia de los shocks sobre el crimen. Los resultados sostienen alta persistencia de los 
shocks sobre el crimen 
 
Keywords:  Crime Persistence, Regional Disparities, Typologies of Crime, Socio-Economic 
and Deterrence Effect 
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 I. Introduction 
 
Crime has frequently been identified as one of the most important public problems in Argentina 
(see, for example, Latinobarometro, 2012). Far from improving, this problem has become even 
worse over time.  According to official statistics, the crime rate in Argentina increased 312.6 % 
in the period that span from 1980 to 2008 (i.e., it increased at an average annual rate of 5.2%). 
Moreover, violent crime has increased at a higher rate and raised their participation in total 
crime. 
Although a generalized problem, crime rates vary considerably by region and these differences 
are found to be persistent over time. For example, in 2000 Capital Federal had the highest 
crime rates, followed by Neuquén and Mendoza. At the other extreme, Misiones had the lowest 
crime rate. Eight years later, in 2008, Capital Federal still leaded the ranking of provinces with 
the highest crime rate, followed again by Neuquén and Mendoza, while Misiones remained at 
the lower tail of the distribution. Our hypothesis is that these differences in regional crime rates 
and their persistence over time may be explained by two factors. First, differences in regional 
crime rates may be persistent due to persistent differences in the regional institutional and 
socio-economic conditions that determine crime equilibrium levels. Second, crime rate 
differences across regions may also subsist because of the persistent effects of shocks 
affecting the crime rate. The aim of this paper is to disentangle these two sources of regional 
crime persistence in the Argentinean regions over the period 1980-2008. To our knowledge, this 
topic has not yet been studied in the literature on crime and this is the main contribution of our 
paper. 
From a public policy perspective, studying the sources of crime persistence is a relevant issue. 
On the one hand, the theoretical literature on crime focuses on two types of variables that 
determine the financial rewards from crime relative to the financial rewards from legal work: (i) 
the deterrence related variables, measured by the probability of being arrested and of being 
condemned, and (ii) the social and macroeconomic environment, which generates an 
atmosphere more or less prone to crime, measured by variables such as the unemployment 
rate, income per capita, income growth, income inequality, productive structure, among others. 
If crime rates are found to mainly respond to these variables, authorities would only be able to 
reduce crime by acting on these variables.  
On the other hand, if shocks have persistent effects on the crime rate, authorities should 
prevent individuals form entering into criminal activities, since once they are engaged in these 
activities, it will hard to take them out. This idea of crime persistence is consistent with a 
dynamic model of criminal activity, where individuals are endowed with legal and criminal 
human capital and this human capital can be enhanced by participating in the relevant sector 
and is subject to depreciation (see Mocan et al, 2005). Legal human capital can also be 
enhanced through investment. According to crime theory, there is a possibility for an individual 
to participate in the illegal sector during a shock. However, contrary to standard crime theory 
predictions, this individual may tend to remain in the criminal sector after the shock due to the 
simultaneous depreciation of her legal human capital and appreciation of her criminal human 
capital during the time spent in this sector. If this was the case, authorities should promote 
investment in legal human capital via education either by promoting a sufficiently high rate of 
return to legal human capital, or by lowering the costs of such investment. Increased legal 
human capital will prevent individuals form entering to the illegal sector.   
We use an annual panel from 1980 to 2008 for 24 Argentinean regions (provinces) to estimate a 
dynamic model of crime using the Generalized Method of Moments estimator (GMM) proposed 
by Arellano and Bover (1995), which allows us to distinguish between the two sources of 
persistence discussed above. In our analysis, we distinguish among different typologies of crime 
(total crime, property crime, theft, robbery, crimes against persons and murders). 
We find that the parameter of the lagged dependent variable, which measures the degree of 
persistence of shocks in time, is typically positive and statistically significant. We find a relatively 
high autocorrelation coefficient in the regional total crime series, even after conditioning on 
deterrence and socio-economic variables. After a year, between 70% and 80% of a regional 
shock to crime will still be affecting regional total crime. Two years later, only 40%-50% of the 
effect of the shock on regional total crime will have disappeared. Crime, at the regional level, 
presents a very high persistence to idiosyncratic shocks. For all property crimes, robberies and 
crimes against persons, persistence is similar to total crime. For theft, persistence is much lower 
and even becomes non-statistically significant when we control for socio-economic variables. 
This is consistent with our hypothesis that theft involves less illegal human capital than 
robberies and hence the switch from theft to the legal sector is easier than from robberies.  
As expected, we find that the arrest and sentence rates have a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the crime rate, which points to the relevance of both police and judicial 
performance in the deterrence of crime. We also find that property crime rates are more 
sensitive to economic fluctuations than crimes against persons, which is in line with previous 
findings (see Cook and Sarkin (1985), Arvanites and Delfina (2006)). Finally, we find that 
regions with higher product shares in construction and government have lower crime. We 
conjecture that, since these activities are labor intensive, they affect crime rate through 
unemployment rate, and also through GDP, given that regions with higher product shares in 
construction and government are those with lower GDP per capita. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II analyzes the regional structure of crime 
rate in Argentina and its evolution over time. Section III presents the econometric model to be 
estimated, which allows us to distinguish between persistence due to socio-economic and 
deterrence variables and due to the persistence of the shocks. Section IV summarizes the data 
used for the estimation, while Section V presents the econometric results. Finally, Section VI 
concludes. 
 
 
II. Stylized Facts  
 
In this Section, we analyze the regional structure of crime in Argentina to see whether it shows 
persistence both across provinces and over time. 
First, to analyze persistence across provinces, Figure 1 plots Argentinean provinces total crime 
rankings at two points in time, 2000 and 2008. 
 
Figure 1.Ranking of total crime in Argentinean provinces. 2000-2008 
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Figure 1 shows that the regional structure of crime in Argentina is persistent over time. To test 
this hypothesis we compute the correlation coefficient between 2000 and 2008 crime rate 
rankings. The Spearman coefficient is 0.793 and it is statistically significant different from zero 
at a 1% level, indicating that the regional structure of crime in Argentina has not significantly 
changed between 2000 and 2008. This result holds when we consider crime rates instead of 
rankings (correlation coefficient of 0.8435 and statistically significant at a 1% level), different 
decades (correlation coefficient of 0.693 for 1980-1990 and 0.5409 for 1990-2000, both 
statistically significant at a 1% level). Only when we consider the longest available period of time 
(1980-2008), the Spearman coefficient is no longer statistically significant, indicating that 
persistence, although high, eventually disappears. 
Figure 2 shows similar scatter plots for different typologies of crime. As before, we find that the 
regional structure of different types of crimes remains constant over time. The correlation 
coefficient between 2000 and 2008 crime rate rankings are positive and statistically significant 
for all types of crimes (correlation coefficient of 0.8426 for property crime, 0.7496 for robbery, 
0.8278 for theft, 0.8130 for other property crimes, 0.8484 for crimes against persons, and 
0.6909 for murders).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.Ranking of crime in Argentinean provinces by type of crime. 2000-2008 
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Theft Other property crimes 
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Crimes against persons Murders 
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Second, in order to evaluate the dynamics of the changes in the regional crime structure, in 
Table 1 we compute Spearman correlations for total crime rankings between selected pairs of 
years. Table A.2 in the Appendix displays correlation coefficients for rankings of different types 
of crimes for all pairs of years between 2000 and 2008. 
 
 
Table 1.Spearman correlation coefficients. Total crime rate. Argentina Regions 1980-2008 
 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
1982 0.8209* 1             
1984 0.7417* 0.8243* 1            
1986 0.6922* 0.7983* 0.8452* 1           
1988 0.6235* 0.7739* 0.9322* 0.8487* 1          
1990 0.6930* 0.8443* 0.7991* 0.8365* 0.7435* 1         
1992 0.6539* 0.7817* 0.6922* 0.7400* 0.6104* 0.8765* 1        
1994 0.4887 0.6826* 0.6930* 0.6557* 0.7122* 0.6861* 0.7704* 1       
1996 0.4096 0.6539* 0.6896* 0.6522* 0.7774* 0.6878* 0.6591* 0.9157* 1      
1998 0.5746* 0.7605* 0.8053* 0.6681* 0.8347* 0.7583* 0.6390* 0.8202* 0.9332* 1     
2000 0.3661 0.4939 0.5157* 0.4835 0.6183* 0.5409* 0.493 0.7583* 0.8922* 0.8949* 1    
2002 0.38 0.5157* 0.4478 0.4557 0.5322* 0.5330* 0.4513 0.6209* 0.8035* 0.8902* 0.9070* 1   
2004 0.4183 0.6243* 0.5939* 0.5304* 0.6548* 0.6461* 0.5583* 0.7687* 0.9157* 0.9171* 0.8730* 0.8748* 1  
2006 0.4783 0.6426* 0.6539* 0.5357* 0.6965* 0.5852* 0.513 0.7704* 0.8922* 0.9026* 0.7965* 0.8270* 0.9365* 1 
2008 0.3096 0.4948 0.5374* 0.4452 0.6052* 0.44 0.4174 0.7261* 0.8530* 0.7979* 0.7930* 0.7565* 0.8600* 0.9157* 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Table 1 confirms that Argentina presents high persistence in its regional crime structure. 
There is a clear association between the relative crime situations at the beginning of the 
1980s with that at the mid-2000s. Hence, no significant changes have taken place in the 
regional crime structure of Argentina over time. In addition, the crime ranking changed 
relatively more in the early 1980s than in the 1990s and 2000s. The Spearman coefficient 
is 0.62 between 1980 and 1988, while the same statistic is 0.76 for the period 1990–1998 
and 0.79 for 2000-2008. 
With all this evidence at hand, we can conclude that regional structure of crime rate in 
Argentina shows very high persistence. This persistence is also observed for different 
types of crime. Moreover, this structure has changed during this period and persistence 
was stronger during the 1990s and 2000s, coinciding with a period of structural reforms in 
the country. Additionally, it is worth noting that crime trended up dramatically during the 
period studied and the range of variability in the regional crime rates diminished. In the 
next section we proceed to model the conditional means of the regional crime series. 
 
 
III. A model of regional crime  
 
Our empirical approach is borrowed from other economic areas, specifically from 
Unemployment and Income Distribution persistence literature. For example, Galiani et al 
(2004) analyze the persistence in unemployment in Argentinean regions. They try to 
identify regional factors that explain regional unemployment differences and whose 
changes account for the low persistence of the regional unemployment structure. Sosa 
Escudero et al (2006) investigate the main sources of persistence and variability of 
incomes using a panel dataset of rural El Salvador. As far as we know, the present paper 
is the first empirical research that studies the regional persistence of total crime and its 
typologies.1 
In order to investigate the persistence of regional crime, we can estimate the following 
dynamic panel data models: 
 
CRit=αi + λt +η1 CRit-1+εit    (1) 
CRit=αi + λt +η2 CRit-1+ ßXit+ εit    (2) 
Where i states for province and t for year, CR is the log of the number of crimes per 
10,000 inhabitants, αi is a province effect, λt is a year fixed effect, Xit is a vector of socio- 
economic and deterrence variables, and εit is the error term.  
As Galiani et al (2004) point out, model (2) overcomes model (1). If Xit and CRit-1 are 
strongly exogenous, η2 identifies the true persistence of the shocks of the crime rate 
series. If Xit are persistent series, the estimate of η1, picks up the persistence of the Xit and 
confounds it with the persistence of the shocks of the crime rate series. Then, by 
                                                            
1There is abundant literature referring to the persistence of offenders, that try to establish the 
personal characteristics of criminals, who once onset in criminal activities, persist on them (see 
Garside (2004), Britta Kygvsaard (2003), Dean, Brame and Piquero (2006)). There is also literature 
referred to the persistence of crime prone places over time (see  Don Weatherburn and Bronwyn 
Lind (2004)). 
estimating model (2) we obtain a better measure of persistence and it is possible to obtain 
consistent estimates of the persistence of the regional crime rate to pure regional shocks. 
Variables Xit include variables related to the theoretical model of crime, which focuses on 
two main issues: (i) the deterrence effect, related to the probability of being arrested and 
being condemned, and (ii) the social and macroeconomic effects, measured by variables 
such as income per capita, the productive structure of GDP, income growth, income 
inequality, unemployment rate, among others. 
The expected signs of deterrence variables are negative since they represent a cost to 
those who commit crimes. Therefore, as the rate of sentence and arrest increase, the 
crime rate is expected to decrease, ceteris paribus. These effects are well documented for 
the US and Europe (Levitt, 1998; Edmark, 2005; Entorf and Spengler, 2000). For 
Argentina, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) analyze car thefts before and after a terrorist 
attack on the main Jewish center in Buenos Aires and find a large deterrent effect of police 
on crime.  
In addition, socio-economic variables have also been proved to affect crime rate. Empirical 
investigations found that the relationship between crime and economic activity mostly 
depends on the typology of crime. For example, property crimes are found to be counter-
cyclical, while crimes against persons are not as sensitive to economic variations as 
property crimes. 
Unemployment is also central part of criminiometric of Becker-Ehrlich type of models 
(Entorf and Spengler, 2000). To the extent that unemployment limits the legal income 
opportunities, it is expected to trigger illegal activities. However, more recent models that 
proposed slight modifications to the Becker–Ehrlich model produce ambiguous 
comparative-static results. In fact, some empirical studies on the relationship between 
crime and unemployment conclude that the effect of unemployment on crime is ambiguous 
and appears to be very sensitive to the econometric specification. Similarly, the effect of 
inequality on crime is expected to be negative and there are numerous studies that find a 
impact of relative income on crime (see Fajnzylber et al., 2002, Brush, 2007; Choe, 2008, 
Cerro and Meloni, 2001). However, other works fail to find a robust effect of inequality on 
crime (for instance, Neumayer, 2004).  
Finally, the productive structure of the regional GDP can also be related to the crime rate 
explanation. A priori, we do not expect a similar effect of different economic sectors on 
crime rate. For example, those regions with a higher service sector are those with higher 
GDP per capita, and so the expected sign is similar to that of the GDP per capita. 
Similarly, those regions with higher government and construction participation, sectors 
characterized for being labor intensive, are expected to have lower unemployment rates, 
and hence a negative relationship with crime rate. 
For the estimation of the model, we opt for the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and 
Bover (1995). This estimator is designed for dynamic panel data models. The consistency 
of the GMM estimator depends crucially on the absence of serial correlation in εit.  Then, in 
all our specifications, we report the significativity of the Arellano-Bond tests for 
autocorrelation applied to the first difference equation residuals. We expect not to reject 
the null hypothesis on an autoregressive regression model AR(1) but to reject the null 
hypothesis of second order autocorrelation that let us to conclude that lagged values of the 
endogenous variables are valid instruments. Finally, we report the significativity of the 
standard Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. Its null hypothesis is that the 
instruments used by the GMM estimator – as a group – are exogenous. These 
specification tests will confirm whether the GMM estimator is indeed appropriate in our 
case.  
 
IV. Data  
 
The dataset used in this paper is a panel of annual, provincial level observations steaming 
from 1980 to 2008, although time coverage depends on the type of crime. Data were 
collected from several national sources. Data on crime, arrest and sentences were drawn 
from the Registro Nacional de Reincidencia Criminal. Crime rates were defined as the 
number of reported offences per 10,000 inhabitants. Arrest rates were defined as the 
number of crimes with known subjects related to crimes. Finally, sentence rates were 
defined as the number of sentences per arrest, with the exception of total and crimes 
against persons sentence rates that were defined as the number of sentences per crime. 
Our empirical specifications include total crime rate, property crime rate, distinguishing 
between robbery and theft, and crimes against persons, including murders.  
 
 
 
 Table 2 shows the national total number of crimes as well as the crime, arrest and 
sentence rates by type of crime in 2008. Property crimes represent nearly 60% of total 
crimes and it is by far the largest group of crimes. Among property crimes, robbery has the 
highest participation, with 50% of property crimes, followed by thefts, with almost 40%.2 
The second group in importance for its participation in total crime is crimes against 
persons, with a share of 20%. Crimes against persons comprise murders, involuntary 
manslaughter, injuries and traffic fatalities. Even though murders represent less than 1% of 
the crimes against persons, these crimes are analyzed separately as they are the most 
sounded ones due to their severity. 
Regarding deterrence variables, both the probability of arrest and sentence also varies by 
type of crime. In particular, the probability of arrest is relatively high in the case of murders, 
which reflect the fact that for violent crimes the police is more likely to act. Almost 90% of 
suspected murders are arrested, and 50% of those arrested received a sentence. The 
probabilities of arrest and sentence are much lower for property crimes. In particular, the 
probability of arrest is similar for robberies and theft (around 16%). In contrast, given the 
severity of the offense, the probability of sentence is larger for criminals arrested for 
robbery (24%) than for criminals arrested for theft. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
2
 Other types of crimes such as extortions, kidnappings, frauds and usurpation account for the 
remaining 10%. 
 Table 2.Crime, arrest and sentence rates by type of crime. Argentina 2008 
 Reported 
Crimes 
Participation in 
Total Crime 
(%) 
Crime Rate 
per 10000 
inhabitants 
Probability of 
Arrest (%) 
Probability of 
Sentence(%) 
Total Crime 1,310,977 100.00 329.84 - 2.30* 
Property 799,137 60.96 201.06 16.96 14.99 
Robbery 398,271 30.38 100.20 15.54 24.25 
Theft 314,205 23.97 79.05 13.11 6.49 
Others 86,661 6.61 21.80 37.51 7.19 
Against persons 263,124 20.07 66.20 - 1.74* 
Murders 1,986 0.15 0.50 88.67 52.47 
Source: Registro Nacional de Reincidencia Criminal 
Note: * Sentence rate was defined as the total number of sentences per crime. 
 
Table 3 displays the summary statistics of Argentinean provinces crime rates by type of 
crime. Crime rates show a great variation across provinces and over time. For instance, 
the highest crime rate corresponds to the City of Buenos Aires, reaching a rate of 728.3 
crimes per 10,000 inhabitants in 2008. The lowest crime rate of around 40 crimes per 
10,000 inhabitants was registered in the province of Buenos Aires in 1980. The highest 
property crime rate also corresponds to the City of Buenos Aires, reaching a rate of 515.8 
property crimes per 10,000 inhabitants in 2008. The lowest property crime rate was 
registered in Formosa in 1994, with 51 property crimes per 10,000 inhabitants. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Crime rates summary statistics by type of crime. Argentinean provinces 
Crime rates Period Observations Mean Std.Deviation Min Max 
Total 1980-2008 694 245.74 131.40 39.63 728.27 
Property 1991-2008 408 194.62 98.66 50.78 515.87 
Robbery 2000-2008 216 96.96 55.02 24.76 301.60 
Theft 2000-2008 216 102.69 49.79 6.01 248.86 
Other property crimes 2000-2008 216 33.90 21.25 6.99 135.22 
Crimes against persons 2000-2008 198 63.34 22.65 21.82 128.14 
Murders 2000-2008 189 0.53 0.26 0.08 1.36 
Source: Registro Nacional de Reincidencia Criminal 
 
Finally, regarding socio-economic variables, several sources were used. The Gini 
coefficient was obtained from Gasparini et al (2000) for 1990-1999 and from the Instituto 
de Estudios Laborales y Desarrollo Económico (IELDE) from 2000 onwards. No data on 
the Gini coefficient is available prior to 1990. Information on the GDP per capita and its 
structure in constant 1993 pesos was obtained from the Office of the Ministry of 
Economics, from Mirabella and Nanni (1998), and from estimates based on the income-
output matrix for 2000 to 2008. Data on unemployment rates (%) was drawn from the 
Permanent Household Survey carried out by the Argentine National Institute of Statistics 
and Census (INDEC).  
Table 4 shows the summary statistics for these socio-economic variables. GDP per capita 
reached a maximum of 31,014 constant 1993 pesos in the City of Buenos Aires in 2008 
and a minimum of 2,130 constant 1993 pesos in Santiago del Estero in 1982. Not only the 
level, but also the GDP structure varies across provinces. For example, manufacturing is 
relatively important in San Luis, construction in Tierra del Fuego, services in the City of 
Buenos Aires, government in La Rioja, and mining in Santa Cruz. The relative weight of 
the different sectors in the product of the provinces has also varied over time, as a result of 
business cycle, general structural reforms, and specific policies tended to promote one or 
another sector. Finally, the Gini coefficient and the unemployment rate also vary 
significantly across provinces and over time. The Gini coefficient ranged from 33 in Santa 
Cruz in 1990 to 56 in San Luis in 2000. Buenos Aires had an unemployment rate of just 
1% in 1980, while unemployment reached more than 27% in San Juan in 2000. These 
significant differences in the socio-economic variables may be behind the differences in 
crimes rates across provinces. As explained in the previous section, we will control for 
differences in these socio-economic variables in our model to take into account this 
possibility.   
 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics of socio-economic variables 
Variable Period Observations Mean Std Deviation Min Max 
GDP per capita 1980-2008 696 6316.28 4439.11 2129.95 31013.88 
GDP growth rate 1981-2008 672 1.22 6.75 -22.03 36.33 
Manufacturing (%) 1993-2008 384 14.43 8.69 2.85 46.29 
Construction (%) 1993-2008 384 6.93 2.45 0.98 13.08 
Services (%) 1993-2008 384 42.53 6.58 27.17 62.04 
Government (%) 1993-2008 384 7.90 3.05 3.44 17.82 
Mining (%) 1993-2008 384 5.43 10.70 0.00 44.40 
Others (%) 1993-2008 384 22.78 6.93 9.20 36.55 
Gini 1990-2008 433 43.10 3.94 32.91 56.30 
Unemployment 1980-2008 628 9.02 4.57 1.00 27.90 
 
 
 
V. Econometric results 
 
In this section we present the results of our preferred specifications for the regional models 
of different types of crimes.  
We estimate models (1) and (2) above separately for each type of crime.3 The parameter 
of the lagged dependent variable measures the degree of persistence of the shocks in 
time. As we have previously discussed, model (2) is more appropriate to measure 
persistency if Xit is a matrix of persistent variables.4 
In all specifications, deterrence variables are assumed to be predetermined.5 For all cases, 
we do not reject the null hypothesis of the validity of the overidentification restrictions 
(Sargan test) nor the lack of autocorrelation in the residuals at the conventional levels of 
statistical confidence (tests m1 and m2 by Arrellano-Bond). Then, these specification tests 
confirm the appropriateness of GMM system estimators for our models. 
GMM estimates are one-step estimates. Although there exist two-step estimators that are 
asymptotically more efficient, it is well known (see Arellano and Bond, 1991) that two-step 
estimated standard errors in dynamic models can be seriously biased downward, and for 
that reason, one-step estimates with robust standard errors are often preferred. 
Next we describe the results for each type of crime separately. 
 
Total crime 
 
In Table 5 we present the results for the total crime rate. In column (1), we only include the 
lagged dependent variable. In column (2) we add deterrence variables. In column (3) we 
also include the socio-economic variables, except for the product sector composition. In 
column (4), we replace the socio-economic variables in the previous column by the 
economic composition variables. Finally, in column (5) we combine the socio-economic 
and economic structure variables in the two previous columns.  
The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant at a 1% level in all specifications. 
If no other controls are included in the model, we find that a 10% increase in the total 
crime rate in t-1 increases the crime rate in the next period by 9%. The coefficient of 
lagged crime slightly decreases when we add the sentence rate (column (2)) and 
economic structure variables (column (4)) to the model, as expected when persistent 
variables are included in the model. However, even after conditioning on different sets of 
explanatory variables we continue to find a relatively high autocorrelation coefficient in the 
regional total crime series. After a year, between 70% and 80% of a regional shock to 
crime will still be affecting regional crime. Two years later, only 40%-50% of the effect of 
the shock on regional crime will have disappeared. Crime, at the regional level, presents a 
very high persistence to idiosyncratic shocks.  
                                                            
3We tested for unit roots using Levin et al. (2002) test for panel data. The corresponding Levin–Lin modified t-
statistic for the test of the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root suggests that the null should be 
rejected. It is worth mentioning that the possible low power of the Levin–Lin test for the small sample available 
should have biased the result toward accepting the null, contrary to our result. Results are similar for different 
types of crimes (for more details see the Table A.3 in the Appendix).  
4
 Results are similar regardless of whether we include regional fixed effects or not. Time fixed effects are highly 
correlated with socioeconomic variables, which make difficult identifying the effect of these variables on the 
crime rate. We have then omitted regional and time fixed effects in the models’ specifications below.  
5Predetermined variables are variables that were determined prior to the current period. This implies that the 
current period error term is uncorrelated with current and lagged values of the predetermined variables but 
may be correlated with future values. This is a weaker restriction than strict exogeneity, which requires the 
variables to be uncorrelated with past, present, and future shocks. 
Turning to the determinants of crime differences, we find that the sentence rate has a 
negative and significant effect on the crime rate, which is in accordance with the 
predictions of Becker’s theory (1968) on deterrence.6  However, its effect is very low: a 
10% increase in the sentence rate decreases the crime rate by only 0.9%-1% depending 
on the model.  
On the socioeconomic variables (see column (3)), GDP per capita, intending to capture a 
cross-section effect, is positively and significantly associated with crime rates, indicating 
that the higher the regional GDP per capita the higher the crime rate (i.e., a 10% increase 
in the regional GDP per capita increases the crime rate by 1.8%-2.3%). In contrast, 
economic growth, which would be capturing a time effect, has a negative effect on the 
crime rate, indicating that during expansions (recessions) the crime rate decreases 
(increases).7 As observed in previous empirical studies (see Fajnzylber et al., 2002), we 
also find a positive and statistically significant link between inequality, measured by the 
Gini coefficient, and crime. In particular, a 10% increase in the Gini coefficient increases 
the crime rate by 2.7%-3-8%. In accordance with crime theory, which suggests that 
unemployed individuals who have no legal income opportunities are more likely to commit 
crimes than people who have a job, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of 
unemployment on total crime.8 However, due to the high correlation between 
unemployment rate and other socioeconomic9 and economic structure variables, which 
may cause multicollinearity problems, this variable is no longer statistically significant 
when we include other variables and has been omitted in the full model (column (5)). 
Finally, changes in the regional economic structure also affect regional crime. In particular, 
we find that regions with higher product shares in construction have lower crime. We 
conjecture that, since this activity is labor intensive, it affects crime rate through the 
unemployment rate (omitted). We also find that regions with higher product shares in 
services have higher crime.  
 
 
                                                            
6
 Total sentence rate is defined as the ratio between total sentences and crime, since we do not 
have total arrests for the whole period. 
7
 Results are similar if instead of using regional GDP growth rate, we use a dummy variable that 
takes value one for recession years and zero otherwise. 
8
 To test for hysteresis in the regional unemployment rate, we interacted this variable with a dummy 
variable that takes value one for recessions and zero otherwise. However, we do not find a 
significantly different effect of the regional unemployment rate in recessions and expansions.  
9
For example, the correlation between unemployment and Gini coefficient is 0.65 for the period 2000-2008 
Table 5 System GMM estimates. Total Crime (log) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Crime Ratet-1 (log) 0.893*** 0.791*** 0.811*** 0.716*** 0.729***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sentence Rate (log) -0.098*** -0.094*** -0.088*** -0.089***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP pc (log) 0.229*** 0.175**
(0.000) (0.029)
Gini coefficient (log) 0.380*** 0.270***
(0.002) (0.007)
0.0614***
(0.001)
GDP Growth -0.003** -0.0009
(0.034) (0.417)
Construction (%)
-0.0258*** -0.0234**
(0.004) (0.013)
Services (%) 0.0116*** 0.00970**
(0.004) (0.012)
Government (%) -0.0167* -0.00524
(0.058) (0.517)
Mining (%) 0.00731 0.00510
(0.121) (0.178)
Others (%) -0.00477 0.00260
(0.420) (0.665)
Constant
0.621*** 1.236*** -2.412***
1.565***F
52 -1.226
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.219)
Observations 668 667 407 380 367
Number of groups 24 24 24 24 24
Number instruments 400 578 417 387 372
Wald test 3974 2889 2608 4603 2987
Sargan test 500.41*** 875.72*** 548.83*** 504.65*** 436.59***
m1 -3.622*** -3.396*** -3.456*** -3.641*** -3.753***
m2 -2.365** -2.275** -1.908* -2.115** -2.167**
Unemploy. Rate (log)
 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** means statistically significant at 
a 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
Property crime: total, robbery and theft  
 
Table 6 presents the results for property crimes, distinguishing by type of crime. The 
persistence of property crimes varies according to the type of crime. For all property 
crimes taken as a whole, a 10% increase in the crime rate in t-1 leads to a 7-8% increase 
in the crime rate in the next period. Persistence is similar for robberies, which comprises 
more than 50% of all property crimes. In contrast, for theft persistence is much lower. 
Moreover, when we control for socioeconomic variables and, particularly, when we control 
for the regional productive structure, the lagged dependent variable for theft significantly 
decreases and even becomes non-statistically significant. This indicates that much of the 
persistence in the theft crime rate is due to the persistence in the regional socioeconomic 
conditions and economic structure. Theft needs less specialization than robberies and is 
typically the result of specific economic conditions. Criminals will continue committing theft 
as long as the economic conditions that originally motivate them to commit these crimes 
persist. Once these conditions change, they will probably abandon illegal activities.10 In 
contrast, criminals involved in robberies will probably continue committing these crimes, 
even after economic conditions change, as they have already acquired the specific skills 
this type of crime requires. These findings are in line with the results obtained by Kelaher 
and Sarafidis (2011) who find that violent crimes show higher persistence than non-violent 
crimes. 
The estimated effects of the arrest and sentence rates are negative and statistically 
significant for all types of property crimes. These results point to the relevance of both 
police and judicial performance in the deterrence of crime. By construction of the variables 
probability of arrest and sentence, we expect that the marginal deterrence effect of the 
probability of arrest is higher than that of the probability of sentence (see Kelaher and 
Sarafidis (2011)). Empirical results confirm that the effect of arrests is larger (in absolute 
value) than the effect of sentences. By type of property crime, the estimated effect of the 
arrest and sentence rate are larger (in absolute value) for theft than for robbery. This 
evidence supports the hypothesis that persons committing theft probably do it eventually in 
a non-professional way and hence are more likely to be deterred by the fear of being 
caught and condemned.  
For all property crimes taken as a whole and robberies, the effect of the GDP per capita is 
positive and statistically significant. As explained above, this net effect is the result of two 
countervailing forces at place. On the one hand, a higher GDP per capita means more and 
more valuable assets and hence higher expected profits for criminals. On the other hand, 
a higher GDP per capita means lower needs and higher costs for criminals (i.e., the cost of 
losing what they have if they are arrested). For property crimes taken as a whole and 
robberies, the effect of GDP per capita that prevails is the first one. The magnitude of GDP 
net effect is similar than for total crime. Again, as for total crime, economic growth has a 
negative effect on property crimes and robberies. However, as expected, property crimes 
are more responsive to the cycle than total crimes.11 
The unemployment rate is statistically significant only for all property crimes taken as a 
whole. Again, the non-significance of this variable for robberies may be the result of the 
high correlation between unemployment rate and other socioeconomic variables (i.e., the 
Gini coefficient), which intensifies in smaller samples (i.e., from 2000 to 2009), and by 
causing mulicolinearity problems, prevent us from identifying individual effects.  
                                                            
10
 We have also tested for asymmetric reaction of crime rate over time, meaning that increases are 
sharper but decreases are gradual. Mocan and Bali (2005) demonstrate that property crime reacts 
more (less) strongly to increases (decreases) in the unemployment rate, to decreases (increases) in 
per capita real GDP and to decreases (increases) in the police force. However we did not find a 
significant asymmetric reaction. 
 
11
 Results are similar if instead of using regional GDP growth rate, we use a dummy variable that 
takes value one for recession years and zero otherwise. 
In contrast, the Gini coefficient is positive and statistically significant for all types of 
property crimes. Moreover, the effect of the Gini coefficient on property crimes is larger 
than on total crimes, indicating that income inequality specially triggers property crimes.  
Finally, we find that regions with higher product shares in services and mining have higher 
property crime rates. Again, as we pointed out before, the non-significance of the 
economic structure variables for robberies in column (5) may the result of the high 
correlation between them and the socioeconomic variables, which intensifies in smaller 
samples, and by causing mulicolinearity problems, preventing us from identifying individual 
effects. 
We suspect multicolinearity is also responsible for the lack of jointly identification in theft’s 
estimations, where none of the socioeconomic or regional productive structure variables 
are significant (except for the Gini coefficient). Proof of that is the fact that, when included 
one at a time, socioeconomic variables have the expected sign and are statistically 
significant. 12 
                                                            
12
 Results are available from authors upon request 
Table 6 System GMM estimates. Property, robberies and theft crimes (log)  
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Crime Ratet-1 (log) 0.709*** 0.805*** 0.771*** 0.681*** 0.695*** 0.706*** 0.754*** 0.727*** 0.574*** 0.665*** 0.368** 0.443** 0.366* 0.306* 0.281
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0 .028) (0.014) (0.096) (0.062) (0.101)
Arrest Rate (log)
-0.235*** -0.175*** -0.188*** -0.174*** -0.199*** -0.121*** -0.205*** -0.153*** -0.539** -0.525** -0.601** -0.612**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.035) (0.019) (0.012)
Sentence Rate (log)
-0.115*** -0.106*** -0.113*** -0.111*** -0.120*** -0.078*** -0.091*** -0.084*** -0.192*** -0.150** -0.159*** -0.162***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.016) (0.002) (0.001)
GDP pc (log) 0.216*** 0.175*** 0.248*** 0.245*** -0.207 0.205
(0.000) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.440) (0.477)
Gini coefficient (log) 0.423** 0.606*** 0.442** 0.440*** 0.566 0.570*
(0.027) (0.003) (0.032) (0.004) (0.216) (0.096)
0.059*** 0.054 0.012
(0.003) (0 .131) (0.897)
GDP Grow th
-0.007*** -0.004** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.004 -0.004
(0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.589) (0.582)
Construction (%)
-0.0303** -0.0135 -0.037*** -0.011 -0.012 0.003
(0.011) (0.161) (0.000) (0.327) (0.520) (0.897)
Services (%) 0.0134** 0.0105* 0.020* 0.010 -0.006 -0.023
(0.048) (0.053) (0.050) (0.125) (0.786) (0.482)
Government (%)
-0.0107 0.001 -0.032** -0.002 0.080 0.111
(0.425) (0.939) (0.014) (0.875) (0.137) (0.140)
Mining (%) 0.013* 0.010* 0.015*** 0.006 0.026*** 0.018
(0.056) (0.061) (0.009) (0.214) (0.009) (0.166)
Others (%)
-0.008 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.020 0.025
(0.389) (0.877) (0.874) (0.360) (0.258) (0.119)
Constant 1.530*** 1.964*** -1.634* 2.282*** -1.839* 1.328*** 1.955*** -2.151** 2.258*** -2.150** 2.852*** 4.281*** 4.176 4.191*** 0.725
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.038) (0 .000) (0.005) (0.218) (0.008) (0.807)
Observations 360 291 269 267 258 192 171 165 171 167 192 164 158 164 160
Number of groups 24 24 24 24 24 24 22 22 22 22 24 22 22 22 22
Number inst 121 226 223 224 222 36 108 112 113 116 36 107 111 112 115
Wald test*** 195.1 461.0 1047 1711 2146 69.01 250.9 637.0 539.7 840.2 4.862 179.4 292.6 678.1 761.6
Sargan test 267.66*** 320.30*** 257.06** 273.43*** 225.85 190.86*** 192.36*** 118.05 172.32*** 118.36 115.19*** 287.48*** 280.94*** 278.1*** 258.63***
m1 
-3.317*** -3.024*** -2.743*** -3.010*** -2.926*** -2.164** -2.721*** -2.527** -2.140** -2.354** -1.635* -2.675*** -2.245** -2.369** -2.569***
m2
-0.875 -0.632 -1.479 -0.927 -1.289 0.561 0.0891 -0.235 0.194 -0.136 0.501 0.585 -0.0646 0.216 -0.331
All
Unemploy Rate (log)
Robberies Theft
 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** means statistically significant at a 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Crimes against persons: total and murders 
 
Table 7 presents the results for all crimes against persons and murders.  
The dependent variable lagged once is typically positive and statistically significant for 
both, crimes against persons and murders, except murders when no additional regressors 
are included in the model. Moreover, the persistence is much higher for all crimes against 
persons than for murders. However, the persistence of the crimes against persons 
decreases from 0.96 (column (1)) to 0.56 (column (5)) as additional controls are included 
in the model  
The sentence rate has a negative and significant effect on both crimes groups. Arrest rate 
has also a negative and significant effect on murders.  
The GDP per capita coefficient is positive for crimes against persons, although not always 
statistically significant, indicating that the number of crimes against persons increases with 
income, possibly because these crimes comprise traffic offences, whose participation has 
increased with the increase in the vehicle fleet, which, in turn, has been higher in regions 
with higher GDP per capita. In contrast, the GDP per capita coefficient is negative for 
murders, although not always statistically significant,. GDP growth has a significant effect 
on crimes against persons, but not on murders. Similarly, neither the unemployment rate 
nor the Gini coefficients are statistically significant in the explanation of crimes against 
persons or murders. 
Finally, we find that regions with higher product shares in government, which are the 
regions with lower GDP per capita, have lower rates of crimes against persons. Once we 
control for GDP per capita, the product share in government is no longer significant. In 
contrast, the product share in government is statistically significant for murders even after 
controlling for GDP per capita, probably via employment effect.  
 
 
Table 7 System GMM Estimates. Crimes against persons and murders (log) 
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CrimeRatet-1 (log) 0.955*** 0.843*** 0.677*** 0.618*** 0.560*** 0.239 0.503*** 0.458*** 0.436*** 0.390***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.109) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Arrest Rate (log) -0.451*** -0.468*** -0.485*** -0.494***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sentence Rate (log) -0.052** -0.053** -0.051** -0.061** -0.375*** -0.369*** -0.364*** -0.371***
(0.019) (0.014) (0.031) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP pc (log) 0.272** 0.210 -0.194 -0.781**
(0.050) (0.236) (0.385) (0.043)
Gini coefficient (log) 0.214 0.059 0.096 -0.661
(0.347) (0.782) (0.866) (0.197)
Unemployment Rate (log) 0.041 0.034
(0.447) (0.722)
GDP Growth 0.003* 0.005** 0.002 0.004
(0.094) (0.039) (0.715) (0.567)
Construction (%) -0.011 -0.027** -0.014 -0.027
(0.227) (0.031) (0.500) (0.464)
Services (%) 0.0003 0.011 0.018 0.021
(0.970) (0.481) (0.323) (0.411)
Government (%) -0.049** -0.031 -0.013 -0.094**
(0.0289) (0.214) (0.681) (0.0486)
Mining (%) 0.004 0.008 0.011 0.016
(0.588) (0.238) (0.412) (0.378)
Others (%) -0.010 -0.006 0.016 0.003
(0.413) (0.700) (0.248) (0.877)
Constant 0.215 0.702** -1.871 2.253** -0.135 -0.619*** 3.201*** 4.432 2.255* 12.32***
(0.474) (0.026) (0.109) (0.016) (0.939) (0.000) (0.000) (0.266) (0.051) (0.002)
Observations 176 174 168 174 170 168 151 147 151 147
Number groups 22 22 22 22 22 21 20 20 20 20
Number ins 36 80 84 85 88 36 118 122 123 126
Wald test 164.7 211.7 138.5 314.4 149.6 2.570 91.91 124.6 399.1 406.7
Sargan test 39.05 138.70*** 126.94*** 127.51*** 118.60 72.04*** 157.90*** 153.46*** 159:78*** 150.25**
m1 -3.387*** -3.498*** -3.153*** -3.531*** -3.102*** -2.909*** -2.178** -2.147** -2.270** -2.363**
m2 0.773 0.750 1.036 0.752 1.441 1.196 1.576 1.542 1.672* 1.676*
Crimes against persons Murders
 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** means statistically significant at 
a 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper aimed at studying the persistence of Argentinean regional crime rate and its 
typologies in the period 1980-2008, although time coverage depends on the type of crime. 
Our goal was to identify the sources of crime persistence: the equilibrium levels of crime 
and the response to shocks over time.  
The descriptive analysis shows that Argentina presents high persistence in its regional 
crime structure, both for total crime rate and for different types of crime. In all cases, there 
is a clear association between the relative crime situation at the beginning of the 1980s 
and that at the mid-2000s. In addition, the provinces crime rankings changed relatively 
more in the early 1980s than in the 1990s and 2000s.  
We then estimated a dynamic panel data model using the GMM estimator proposed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995), which allows us to distinguish between the two sources of 
persistence explained above. The model includes a lagged dependent variable and a set 
of explanatory variables related to the standard theoretical model of crime, which focuses 
on two main issues: (i) the deterrence effect, related to the probability of being arrested 
and being condemned, and (ii) the social and macroeconomic effects, measured by 
variables such as income per capita, GDP productive structure, income growth, income 
inequality and unemployment rate. 
We find that the parameter of the lagged dependent variable, which measures the 
degree of persistence of the shocks in time, is typically positive and significant. If 
no other controls are included in the model, we find that a 10% increase in the total 
crime rate in t-1 increases the crime rate in the next period by 9%. After 
conditioning on the set of explanatory variables we continue to find a relatively high 
autocorrelation coefficient in the regional total crime series. After a year, between 
70% and 80% of a regional shock to crime will still be affecting regional total crime. 
Two years later, only 40%- 50% of the effect of the shock on regional total crime 
will have disappeared. For all property crimes, robberies and crimes against persons, 
persistence is similar to total crime. For theft, persistence is much lower and even 
becomes non-statistically significant when we control for socio-economic variables. This 
indicates that much of the persistence in theft is due to the persistence in the socio-
economic variables.  
As expected, we find that the arrest and sentence rates have a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the crime rate, which points to the relevance of both police and judicial 
performance in the deterrence of crime. 
On the economic variables, the effect of GDP per capita on crime is undetermined: it is 
positive and significant for all crimes, property crimes, robberies, and crimes against 
persons, and negative for murders. Similarly, economic growth has a negative and 
significant effect on total crime and all types of property crimes (except for theft for which it 
is not significant), and a positive and significant effect on crimes against persons.  
We find a positive and significant relationship between inequality, measured by the Gini 
coefficient, and total crime, property crimes, robberies and theft. However, we only find a 
statistically significant effect of unemployment on total crime and property crimes. We 
suspect multicolinearity is responsible for the lack of jointly identification of these two 
variables in theft’s estimations. Proof of that is the fact that, when included one at a time, 
these variables have the expected sign and are statistically significant.  
Finally, we find that regions with higher construction and government product shares have 
lower crime. We conjecture that, since these activities are labor intensive, they affect crime 
rate through unemployment rate, and also through GDP, given that regions with higher 
product shares in construction and government are those with lower GDP per capita.  
In sum, we found high persistence in regional crime rates over time, for both total crime 
and different types of crime. This persistence is only partially explained by the persistence 
of institutional or socio-economic variables. After controlling for institutional and socio-
economic variables, crime at the regional level continues to present a very high 
persistence to idiosyncratic shocks. These results suggest that policies to deter criminal 
activities should include preventing individuals from entering into the illegal sector because 
once they do so; they may have no incentives to abandon it. A possible explanation for this 
comes from the accumulation of illegal human capital and the depreciation of legal human 
capital during the time spent in the illegal sector. In this case, prevention would imply 
encouraging investment in legal human capital via education either by promoting a 
sufficiently high rate of return to legal human capital, or by lowering the costs of such 
investment.  
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 Appendix 
 
Table A.1 Provinces nomenclature 
Province Nomenclature 
BUENOS AIRES BA 
CAPITAL FEDERAL CF 
CATAMARCA CAT 
CHACO CHA 
CHUBUT CHU 
CORDOBA CBA 
CORRIENTES CTE 
ENTRE RIOS ER 
FORMOSA FOR 
JUJUY JUJ 
LA PAMPA PAM 
LA RIOJA RIO 
MENDOZA MZA 
MISIONES MIS 
NEUQUEN NEU 
RIO NEGRO RIO 
SALTA SAL 
SAN JUAN SJU 
SAN LUIS SLU 
SANTA CRUZ SCR 
SANTA FE SFE 
SANTIAGO DEL 
ESTERO SGO 
TIERRA DEL FUEGO TFU 
TUCUMAN TUC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2Spearman correlation coefficients by type of crime. Argentina Regions 2000-2008 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Property crimes        
2000 1        
2001 0.9522* 1       
2002 0.9130* 0.9757* 1      
2003 0.9391* 0.9704* 0.9522* 1     
2004 0.8722* 0.8913* 0.8330* 0.9026* 1    
2005 0.8183* 0.8313* 0.7809* 0.8365* 0.9452* 1   
2006 0.8070* 0.8113* 0.7591* 0.8261* 0.9087* 0.9626* 1  
2007 0.8687* 0.8748* 0.8200* 0.8939* 0.8948* 0.8922* 0.9104* 1 
2008 0.8470* 0.8217* 0.7548* 0.8417* 0.9035* 0.9026* 0.9035* 0.9391* 
Robbery         
2000 1        
2001 0.9800* 1       
2002 0.9704* 0.9922* 1      
2003 0.8974* 0.9313* 0.9383* 1     
2004 0.8278* 0.8591* 0.8574* 0.9243* 1    
2005 0.6930* 0.7183* 0.7157* 0.8035* 0.9061* 1   
2006 0.7009* 0.7217* 0.7252* 0.7957* 0.8991* 0.9904* 1  
2007 0.7122* 0.7217* 0.7287* 0.8035* 0.8922* 0.9809* 0.9835* 1 
2008 0.7496* 0.7557* 0.7626* 0.8252* 0.9157* 0.9478* 0.9374* 0.9678* 
Theft         
2000 1        
2001 0.9704* 1       
2002 0.9426* 0.9539* 1      
2003 0.9261* 0.9530* 0.9600* 1     
2004 0.8878* 0.9122* 0.8661* 0.9322* 1    
2005 0.8696* 0.8870* 0.8296* 0.8887* 0.9313* 1   
2006 0.8774* 0.8696* 0.8052* 0.8513* 0.9287* 0.9496* 1  
2007 0.9130* 0.9287* 0.9087* 0.8852* 0.8339* 0.8330* 0.8722* 1 
2008 0.8278* 0.8009* 0.7435* 0.7826* 0.7887* 0.8652* 0.8896* 0.8313* 
Other property crimes       
2000 1        
2001 0.9261* 1       
2002 0.7878* 0.8313* 1      
2003 0.9322* 0.9722* 0.8739* 1     
2004 0.8791* 0.8713* 0.8078* 0.9183* 1    
2005 0.9348* 0.9643* 0.8513* 0.9713* 0.9113* 1   
2006 0.9148* 0.9365* 0.8478* 0.9209* 0.8609* 0.9696* 1  
2007 0.9061* 0.9252* 0.7861* 0.9200* 0.8365* 0.9478* 0.9565* 1 
2008 0.8130* 0.8626* 0.6896* 0.8330* 0.7626* 0.8809* 0.8991* 0.9504* 
Crimes against persons       
2000 1        
2001 0.9232* 1       
2002 0.9051* 0.9785* 1      
2003 0.8938* 0.9571* 0.9706* 1     
2004 0.9345* 0.9345* 0.9514* 0.9605* 1    
2005 0.9560* 0.9153* 0.9040* 0.8938* 0.9560* 1   
2006 0.9029* 0.8769* 0.8995* 0.8826* 0.9345* 0.9684* 1  
2007 0.9085* 0.8769* 0.8848* 0.8859* 0.9130* 0.9401* 0.9526* 1 
2008 0.8487* 0.8069* 0.8250* 0.8419* 0.8780* 0.8871* 0.9040* 0.9503* 
Murders         
2000 1        
2001 0.7260* 1       
2002 0.7026* 0.7831* 1      
2003 0.7714* 0.6571* 0.8091* 1     
2004 0.7468* 0.7623* 0.7623* 0.6805* 1    
2005 0.5857* 0.7286* 0.8753* 0.7429* 0.8026* 1   
2006 0.5792* 0.7026* 0.7818* 0.6662* 0.7597* 0.9234* 1  
2007 0.6974* 0.6987* 0.8766* 0.7974* 0.8104* 0.9078* 0.8870* 1 
2008 0.6909* 0.7922* 0.8234* 0.8104* 0.7753* 0.8714* 0.8247* 0.8818* 
 
 
 
 
Table A.3Levin-Lin-Chu panel data unit test root with 1 lag 
 No time trend  Time trend 
  Adjusted t P-value  Adjusted t P-value 
Total -2.883 0.002  -2.427 0.008 
Property -5.498 0.000  -2.120 0.017 
Robbery -11.572 0.000  -27.129 0.000 
Theft -8.569 0.000  -26.843 0.000 
Other property crimes -15.316 0.000  -21.875 0.000 
Crimes against persons 0.312 0.623  -10.909 0.000 
Murders -6.525 0.000  -13.152 0.000 
Note: Ho: Panels contain unit roots. Ha: Panels are stationary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
